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Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of data integrity
attacks (DIAs) on cooperative economic dispatch of distributed
generators (DGs) in autonomous AC microgrids. To establish
resiliency against such attacks and ensure optimal operation,
a linear regression based control update is designed in this
paper. To improve the robustness against multiple points of
intrusion, the design of the resilient control update involves
local measurements. As a result, any maloperation due to DIA
is prevented from being propagated to the neighboring nodes.
The proposed strategy acts immediately upon detection of data
integrity attack to ensure maximization in the economic profit.
Index Terms—AC microgrids, Cyber security, Data integrity
attacks, Cyber attacks, Economic load dispatch
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the flexibility of their application in both grid-
connected and islanded modes, microgrids were established as
key enablers for the integration of renewable energy sources
[1]. To facilitate its operation under transmission delay and
information failure, cooperative/distributed controllers with
robust performance towards cyber layer imperfections are
preferred in recent times [2]. Unlike operating in longer time
scales with static demand feedback in the centralized system,
cooperative dispatching often allows online actions for every
increase in load in real time [3]. As a result, it improves the
economic profile of the generators in a given duration.
Considerably less effort has gone into analyzing cyber
attacks in cooperative optimization. To name a few, Chow et.
al. [4] have designed a reputation-based detection algorithm
to detect attacks on the economic dispatch (ED) problem.
However, it is not fully cooperative, as the algorithm requires
a centralized control center. Since these mechanisms are
highly prone to single point of failure, the optimal operation
of the system can easily be disrupted [6]. To increase the
generation cost, any adversarial false data in the cooperative
ED optimization model is categorized as a data integrity attack
(DIA) in this paper. Such attacks alter the power flows with
respect to the optimal solution [7].
Further, data intrusion from stealth attacks is also possible,
as demonstrated in [8]-[12]. Such attacks are capable of
increasing the generation cost without causing any obvious
indications of power imbalance. To formulate an attack-
resilient mechanism, a two-hop neighboring information-based
verification algorithm to detect and restore the system from
DIAs is also reported in [5]. This algorithm is capable of
detecting non-optimal and non-feasible solutions simultane-
ously. Nevertheless, its performance is highly dependent on the
information from multiple neighbors, which may be a problem
in cases of a compromised link or link failure. Many event-
driven resilient strategies have also been proposed in [14]-[17],
which ensure the best resiliency measures in power electronics
even using a single trustworthy agent. In fact, the authors in
[13] have modeled DIA, which manipulates the power dispatch
of each generator to gain monetary benefits without de-
stabilizing the system. Further, they provide a localized event-
driven operation, which provides resilience against several
cyber-physical disturbances. However, the design can be a
complex approach.
To address these issues, this paper proposes:
1) a simple linear regression based resilient control update
against data integrity attacks in cooperative microgrids
to ensure optimality,
2) design of the resilient update only considering local
measurements to enhance the operational flexibility.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
A. Control of Cooperative AC Microgrids
An autonomous AC microgrid with N inverter based DG
sources is shown in Fig. 1. The considered microgrid system
consists of three layer: the physical layer, control layer and cy-
ber communication layer. The physical layer comprises of the
entire microgrid network N inverters connected to a LCL filter.
Lk, Cf and Lg represent per phase inductance and capacitance
of the filter circuit and grid-side inductance, respectively. In
the system shown in Fig. 1 which comprises of N agents, each
communication graph is represented via edges to constitute an
adjacency matrix A = [akj ] ∈ RN×N , where the communi-
cation weights are given by: akj > 0, if (Ψk,Ψj) ∈ E, where
E is an edge connecting two nodes with Ψk and Ψj being
the local and neighboring node measurements, respectively.
Otherwise, akj = 0. Nk = {j|(Ψk,Ψj) ∈ E} denotes the
set of all neighbors of kth agent. Further, the in-degree matrix
Zin = diag{zin} is a diagonal matrix with its elements given
by zin =
∑
j∈Nk akj . The Laplacian matrix L is defined as
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Fig. 1. Single-line diagram of a cyber-physical AC microgrid consisting of
N DGs managed by a cooperative cyber topology. The data integrity attack
is highlighted in red to change the cost parameters, affecting the optimal
operation.
To improve their performance, neighboring inverters’ mea-
surements, which are transmitted to the local inverter and
vice-versa, are used in a cooperative secondary controller to
regulate their respective bus’ average voltage V̄k and frequency
ωk. The control objectives of the cooperative controller can be
mathematically represented as:
lim
t→∞ωk(t) = ω
∗, lim
t→∞ V̄k(t) = V
∗, ∀ k ∈ N (1)
where ω∗ and V ∗ denote the global reference for frequency
and voltage, respectively. Detailed control equations of coop-
erative secondary controller in AC microgrids can be referred
from [2]. To achieve proportionate active power sharing along-
with frequency restoration, the primary layer droop control is
modified into:
ωk(t) = ω
∗ −mk(Pk(t)− P refk (t)) (2)
where mk, Pk and P
ref
k denote the active power droop
coefficient, measured active power and secondary control
active power reference in the kth agent, respectively. The
active power control in each DG is augmented with frequency
restoration to minimize the generation cost for economic
operation. To this end, we consider the general quadratic cost
function for each DG to provide the operational cost, given
by:
Ck(Pk) = akP
2
k + bkPk + ck (3)
where ak, bk and ck are the cost coefficients of the source
in kth DG. Following the generation-demand balance equality
constraint, the objective of optimal load sharing is to minimize
the total cost of all DGs using:
min C(P ) =
N∑
k=1
Ck(Pk) (4)
s.t.[
N∑
k=1
Pk = P
D, Pmink < Pk < P
max
k ] ∀k ∈ N
where PD, Pmink and P
max
k denotes the total demand in the
microgrid, minimum and maximum active power for kth DG
respectively. Further, (4) can be solved using its associated
Lagrange function as:
Lλ =
N∑
k=1
Ck(Pk) + λk
N∑
k=1
(PDk − Pk) (5)
where λk and P
D
k denote the incremental cost and local active
power demand respectively. Differentiating (5) with respect to
Pk using the first-order optimality condition, we can initialize
the incremental cost using:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pk(0) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Pmink , P
D
k < P
min
k
PDk , P
min
k < P
D
k < P
max
k
Pmaxk , P
D
k > P
max
k
λk(0) = 2akPk(0) + bk
ηk(0) = P
D
k − Pk(0)
(6)
To minimize the total generation cost subjecting to the
equality constraints, it is required that the incremental cost
of each DG be equal [18], which is carried out using a power
correction term ΔPk, given by:
ΔṖk =
∑
j∈Nk
akj(λj − λk) (7)
Using (7), the active power reference for each DG with
regulation of the local frequency can be obtained using:
P refk = P
initial
k + gk
∫ τ
0
(ω∗ − ωk(t))dτ +ΔPk. (8)
Substituting (8) into (2), the active power droop control law
operates to restore frequency of each bus to the rated value and
participates in the optimal load sharing. Hence using (2)-(8),
a unified cooperative control structure for economic dispatch
is devised for AC microgrid to achieve:
lim
t→∞λk = λ
opt, lim
t→∞Pk(t) = P
opt ∀k ∈ N (9)
where λopt and P opt denote the optimal incremental cost
and corresponding active power generation from kth DG in
the absence of cyber attack. However, any change in cost
parameters or displacing of the incremental cost in (6) by an
adversary, denoted as a data integrity attack (DIA), will cause
the system to operate in an non-optimal state. As a result,
such attacks reduce the energy efficiency, which needs to be
identified and mitigated immediately.
B. Attack Modeling
Two types of DIAs have been considered in this paper.
These attacks are given by:
λfk(i+ 1) = λk(k) +
∑
j∈Nk
wkj(λj(i)− λk(i)) + ζuaλk︸ ︷︷ ︸
DIA1
(10)
λfk(i) = (1− ζ)λk(i) + ζλck︸ ︷︷ ︸
DIA2
(11)
where uaλi is an exogenous attack input in i
th DG and ζ is a
binary variable which is equal to 1 in the presence of DIA,
or 0 otherwise. Moreover, λci denotes a constant valued attack
element, which does not update in an iterative manner.
In (10), the attack can be injected by changing the cost
parameters using:
uaλk =
{
−ΔakPk
−Δbk
(12)
where Δak and Δbk denote positive attack coefficients, when
added to the cost function in (3) increase the overall generation
cost. Hence, using (11), the consensus algorithm maloperates
during the update process, which converges to an arbitrary
value. Due to this maloperation, the control objectives in (9)
are altered to:
lim
t→∞λk(t) = λ
∗, lim
t→∞Pk(t) = P
∗ ∀k ∈ N (13)
where λ∗ and P ∗ denote the optimal setpoints for incremental
cost and active power under the presence of DIA, respectively.
It should be noted that there lies a considerable steady-state
difference between λopt and λ∗, which has been theoretically
verified in [2]. Hence, λ∗ denotes the sub-optimal point of
economic operation for DGs in AC microgrids.
To provide a basic understanding, a case study is done
in a microgrid with N = 4 agents (the system and control
parameters can be found in Appendix) in Fig. 2 to study
the impact of change in cost parameters on the performance
of AC microgrids. The cost parameters of each DG are
provided in Table I. It can be seen that the system response
is almost similar under both cases until DIA1 is injected
into DG I at t = 1 sec. As soon as DIA1 is injected, the
dotted lines show the deviation from the actual output as the
incremental cost go up by a steady-state deviation of 0.6 $/kW.
Furthermore, this value will keep increasing as the power
dispatch from each generator change with the increase in
load. To counteract against these attacks, we propose a linear
regression technique which can effectively diminish the impact
of the modeled attacks by an artificial routing of the economic
model parameters and ensure resilient optimal operation.
III. PROPOSED RESILIENT MECHANISM
Considering x(i) = Pk(i) as input and y = λ̂k(i) as the
output, which is supposed to be predicted. A pair (x(i), y(i))
is called a training example for ith instant. Each training set
comprises of m pairs. To describe the supervised learning
Fig. 2. Comparative evaluation of active power and incremental cost under
the absence (solid lines) and presence (dotted lines) of DIA1 – even though
a steady-state solution is reached, a positive drift of 0.6 $/kW is seen thereby
increasing the generation cost and disturbing the optimal operation.
TABLE I
COST COEFFICIENTS OF DG
DG I II III IV
ak ($/kW
2) 0.005 0.0025 0.004 0.006
bk ($/kW) 1 0.6 1.8 0.45
problem more formally, our goal is, given a training set, to
learn a hypothesis function h so that h(x) is a good predictor
for the corresponding value of y. When the output variable
that we’re trying to predict is continuous, we call the learning
problem a regression problem. To perform supervised learning,
we must decide how we’re going to represent the hypotheses
h. As an initial choice, we approximate y as a linear function
of x:
hθx(i) = x(i)
T θ (14)
In (14), θ is a weight, which parameterizes the space of
linear functions mapping from x to y. One of the reasonable
objective is to bring h(x) close to y. To formalize this, we
define a cost function that maps the relationship between
h(x(i)) and y(i), given by:
J(θ) =
1
2
m∑
i=1
(hθx(i)− y(i))2 (15)
In (15), J is minimized without resorting to an iterative
algorithm. In fact, it is minimized explicitly by taking its
derivatives with respect to θ and setting them to zero.
Substituting (14) in (15), we get:
xθ − y =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
x(1)θ
x(2)θ
...
x(m)θ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦−
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
y(1)
y(2)
...
y(m)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (16)
Thus, using the fact that for a vector z, we have that zT z =∑
i
z2i .
xθ − y =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
hθx(1)− y(1)
hθx(2)− y(2)
...
hθx(m)− y(m)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (17)
Hence, the cost function can be obtained using:
J(θ) =
1
2
(xθ − y)T (xθ − y) = 1
2
m∑
i=1
(hθx(i)− y(i))2 (18)
Finally to minimize J , let’s find its derivative with respect to
θ. It is worth notifying that the derivative of J with respect to
θ is denoted as ΔθJ(θ).
The following properties of the trace operator tr(◦) are given
below. Here, A and B are square matrices, and a is a real
number:
• tr(A)=tr(AT )
• tr(A+B)=tr(A) + tr(B)
• tr(aA) = a.tr(A)
• tr(AB)=tr(BA)
Furthermore, the derivative output using the trace operator is
given by:
ΔAtr(AB) = BT (19)
ΔAT f(A) = (ΔAf(A))T (20)
ΔAtr(ABAT C) = CAB + CT ABT (21)
Combining (20) and (21), we get:
ΔAT tr(ABAT C) = BT AT CT + BAT C (22)
Using (22) to get the derivative of (18), we get:
ΔθJ(θ) = Δθ
1
2
(xθ − y)T (xθ − y)
=
1
2
Δθ(θ
TxTxθ − θTxT y − yTXθ + yT y)
(23)
ΔθJ(θ) =
1
2
Δθtr(θTxTxθ − θTxT y − yTxθ + yT y) (24)
It is worth notifying that the trace of a real number is just
the real number, given by tr(A) = tr(A)T . Considering this
postulate, (24) can be re-written as:
ΔθJ(θ) =
1
2
Δθ(tr(θTxTxθ)− 2tr(yTxθ)) (25)
Comparing equation (22) and (25), we conclude:
ΔθJ(θ) =
1
2
(xTxθ + xTxθ − 2xT y)
= xTxθ − xT y
(26)
Fig. 3. Control diagram of the proposed linear regression based resilient
controller for the modeled DIAs in cooperative AC microgrids.
To minimize J , we set its derivative to zero in order to obtain:
xTxθ = xT y (27)
Finally, the parameter θ that minimizes J(θ) can be given
by:
θ = (xTx)−1xT y (28)
With parameterization achieved to a certain degree using the
offline historic data from λk and Pk, the estimated cost
coefficients âk and b̂k are fed into the linear regression
model, as shown in Fig. 3, to formalize the presence of any
identification error. Finally, if an error is identified, the next
update is immediately switched using:
λfk = (1− κ)λk + κ(âkPk + b̂k) (29)
Hence, the cooperative update of incremental cost is updated to
ensure resiliency under these conditions. A detailed schematic
of the control diagram is provided in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 4. Single line diagram of the cyber-physical AC microgrid with N = 4
DGs (agents).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed localized event based attack-resilient control
strategy is tested on an AC microgrid, as shown in Fig. 4,
with N = 4 DGs of equal capacity of 10 kVA. The nominal
frequency of the network is 60 Hz. All the system parameters
can be found in Appendix. The cost parameter of each DG
can be referred from Table I.
A case study on the considered system is carried out in Fig.
5(a), with DIA1 in (5) injected by the adversary at t = 0.5
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Performance of AC microgrid with N= 4 DGs : (a) in the absence
and, (b) in the presence of the proposed resilient controller when DIA1 and
DIA2 are launched at t = 0.5 and 1 sec, respectively.
s. Observations in Fig. 5(a) confirm that the incremental cost
of each DG start converging to a feasible solution. Further,
another attack is conducted at t = 1 s, where λc1 = 6.5. It can
be seen that as soon as λ1 settles to 6.5, the remaining DGs
track the set-point as a reference using the consensus theory.
However as per the explained theory, it can be seen in Fig.
5(b) that λ1 immediately reverts back to the normal operating
conditions obeying the consensus theory using the proposed
resilient mechanism.
Fig. 6. Performance of AC microgrid with N =4 DGs when a ramp attack
element in the form of DIA1 is injected at t = 0.5 sec.
In Fig. 6, another case study is carried out where a ramp
attack element (using the DIA1 model in (10)) is injected into
the generation cost model of DG I. It can be seen that when
Δak = −0.005t is injected at t = 0.5 sec, the incremental
cost of each DG remain converged to the pre-attack value.
Particularly, the linear regression technique substitutes the
attacked signal with the estimated signal upon determination
of the error as shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 7. Estimation by the proposed resilient mechanism under normal
operating conditions.
Further in Fig. 7, it can be seen that the estimated signal
follows the calculated incremental cost of DG II under normal
and dynamic conditions. This allows the proposed mechanism
to operate not only like a switching state (Refer to (29))
but it can always be used as a resilient controller to prevent
maloperation due to cyber attacks.
Fig. 8. Performance of AC microgrid with N= 4 DGs : (a) in the absence and,
(b) in the presence of the proposed resilient controller when DIA1 occurs
on all the agents simultaneously at t = 1 sec.
Another case study is carried out in Fig. 8 where DIA1
is conducted simultaneously at t = 1 sec. It can be seen in
Fig. 8(a) that when the cost coefficient bk of each DG (Refer
to Table I) is doubled, the incremental cost increases almost
by 1 $/kW, which disregards the optimal operation. Conse-
quently for any consecutive change in load, the incremental
cost always follows a non-optimal trajectory from here on.
However in the presence of the proposed controller, it can be
seen in Fig. 8(b) that the regression technique immediately
replaces all the attacked λk locally with λ̂k. As soon as it is
replaced, the pre-attack set-point is retained to ensure optimal
operation. This highlights the robustness of using a localized
resilient strategy in handling simultaneous attacks, which can
be the worse case scenario.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a linear regression based resilient
controller to defend cooperative AC microgrids from data
integrity attacks (DIAs). As these attacks cause an increase in
the generation cost, the attack elements need to be removed
immediately from the control system to prevent divergent non-
optimal solutions. In this paper, we have considered two DIAs
namely DIA1 and DIA2, which supports and blocks the
consensus iterative theory, respectively. Hence, the proposed
scheme provides a faster elimination of the attacked signal
by understanding the intrinsic signal properties more closely
and providing an accurate estimation even under attacked
conditions. Moreover, it allows to deal with the correctness of
measurements in each DG locally without infringing neighbor
DG’s cost parameters. Due to its intrinsic localized resilient
feature, this strategy can be leveraged under worse-case dis-
turbances, such as simultaneous DIA attacks on every DG
in the microgrids. Due to the decentralization, it restricts
further cyber interactions to ensure the optimal operation of
AC microgrids.
APPENDIX
It is worth notifying that the control parameters are consis-
tent for each DG, unless stated otherwise.
Plant: R12= 0.23 ohms, L12= 0.000318 H , R23= 0.35 ohms,
L23= 0.001846 H, R34= 1 ohms, L34= 0.001846 H, Cv =
25μF, Lk = 1.8 mH, Lg = 1.8 mH
Controller: m = 0.00014, n = 0.0013, gk = 500, σ = 1.4,
Pmin = {0, 0, 0, 0} kW, Pmax = {4, 4, 4, 4} kW
Inner Current Loop: KpI = 0.7, KiI = 100
Inner Voltage Loop: KpV = 0.35, KiV = 400
Frequency Secondary Control: Kpf = 1, Kpf = 2
Voltage Secondary Control: KpE = 1, KpE = 2
Reactive Power Secondary Control: KpE = 0.0001, KpE = 0.2
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